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 TALKIN’ ‘BOUT A HUMANE REVOLUTION:1 
NEW STANDARDS FOR FARMING 
PRACTICES AND HOW THEY COULD 
CHANGE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS WE 
KNOW IT 
INTRODUCTION 
hat we eat and where it comes from matters.2 While over the 
past few decades animal activists have been advocating for the 
humane treatment of animals,3 the battle over farm animal welfare re-
cently made its way onto the November 2008 California state ballot,4 in 
the form of Proposition 2 (“Prop 2”),5 the Prevention of Farm Animal 
Cruelty Act.6 This Act, while arguably “modest,”7 will prospectively 
improve living standards for farm animals by prohibiting conditions that 
do not allow animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs, or to 
turn around,8 thus banning in California three widely used agricultural 
                                                                                                                       
 1. This title was inspired by Tracy Chapman’s song, “Talkin’ ‘Bout A Revolution.” 
TRACY CHAPMAN, Talkin’ ‘Bout A Revolution, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra/Asylum 
Records 1988). 
 2. See, e.g., JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS 32 (2009) ( “There is some-
thing about eating animals that tends to polarize . . . become an activist or disdain activ-
ists . . . . If and how we eat animals cuts to something deep.”). 
 3. See Kristen Stuber Snyder, Note, No Cracks In the Wall: The Standing Barrier 
and the Need for Restructuring Animal Protection Laws, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 142 
(2009). 
 4. See California Online Voter Guide November 2008 General Election, CAL. 
VOTER FOUND., http://www.calvoter.org/voter/elections/2008/general/props/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2010). 
 5. See id. 
 6. The California Health and Safety Code’s Farm Animal Cruelty provision pro-
vides: 
In addition to other applicable provisions of law, a person shall not tether or 
confine any covered animal, on a farm, for all or the majority of any day, in a 
manner that prevents such animal from: 
Lying down, standing up, and fully extending his or her limbs; and 
Turning around freely. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West 2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). 
 7. Get Involved, Action Alerts & Updates, November 4, 2008: SUCCESS ON PROP 
2!, FARM SANCTUARY (Nov. 4, 2008), 
http://farmsanctuary.org/get_involved/yesonprop2.html [hereinafter Get Involved, Action 
Alerts & Updates]. 
 8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West 2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). 
W 
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confinement systems:9 the battery cage for egg-laying hens,10 the veal 
crate for baby male cows,11 and the gestation crate for pregnant pigs.12 
Due to the nature of California’s agricultural industry, this Act prompted 
a fight between the egg industry and Prop 2 supporters.13 According to 
the agricultural trade magazine Egg Industry,14 animal activists’ efforts 
to bring Prop 2 to the California ballot was not something to be taken 
lightly; United Egg Producers (“UEP”)15 stated that it needed “all hands 
on deck” for what the magazine deemed possibly “one of the biggest and 
most important battles of U.S. egg industry history.”16 UEP was justified 
in its concern; on November 4, 2008 animal rights advocates around the 
U.S. celebrated17 at the expense of agribusiness as Prop 2 passed by 
                                                                                                                       
 9. See, e.g., Get Involved, Action Alerts & Updates, supra note 7. 
 10. About 95% of commercial egg production in the U.S. takes place in these “caged 
layers.” UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY GUIDELINES FOR U.S. EGG 
LAYING FLOCKS 1 (2010), available at http://www.uepcertified.com/media/pdf/UEP-
Animal-Welfare-Guidelines.pdf. “Space allowance should be in the range of 67 to 86 
square inches of usable space per bird to optimize hen welfare.” Id. at 18. This translates 
into “giv[ing] hens less space than the area of a letter-sized sheet of paper in which to eat, 
sleep, lay eggs, and defecate.” Jonathan R. Lovvorn & Nancy V. Perry, California Prop-
osition 2: A Watershed Moment for Animal Law, 15 ANIMAL L. 149, 152 (2009). 
 11. “[V]eal calves are confined in wooden stalls so small that the young animal can-
not turn around.” Mariann Sullivan & David J. Wolfson, If It Looks Like A Duck . . . New 
Jersey, the Regulation of Common Farming Practices, and the Meaning of “Humane,” in 
ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 94, 94 (Taimie L. Bryant, et al. eds., 2008). 
 12. “[B]reeding pigs spend nearly all of their three to four years on earth in metal 
stalls, generally able to take no more than one step forward or back, never able to turn 
around.” Id. 
 13. Prop 2 focused on the hens, because “California doesn’t have much of a veal or 
pork industry . . . California produces 6% of the nation’s eggs.” Julie Schmit, California 
Vote Could Change U.S. Agribusiness, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2008, at 4B. 
 14. See EGG INDUSTRY, http://www.eggindustry-digital.com/eggindustry/200912#pg1 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2010). 
 15. UEP is an organization of egg producers that provides services to its members in 
“government relations, animal welfare, environment, food safety, industry coalition 
building, nutrition, egg trading, member service programs, and communications.” History 
and Background, UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, http://www.unitedegg.org/history/default.cfm 
(last visited July 7, 2010). 
 16. Edward Clark, Standing-Room-Only as UEP Debates How to Counter Activists, 
EGG INDUSTRY 8 (Mar. 2008), http://www.eggindustry-
digital.com/eggindustry/200803?pg=8&pm=2&fs=1#pg8. Prop 2 “effectively bans” stan-
dard battery cages. Schmit, supra note 13. 
 17. It is important to note that not all animal advocates supported Prop 2. See, e.g., 
Gary L. Francione & Anna E. Charlton, Animal Advocacy in the 21st Century: The Aboli-
tion of the Property Status of Nonhumans, in ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 
7, 24 (Taimie L. Bryant, et al. eds., 2008) (in support of the “abolitionist approach” to 
animal advocacy: “As long as a majority of people think that eating animals and animal 
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63.2%,18 thus securing more humane treatment for farm animals raised in 
California.19 
The current American “farm” house, with thousands of animals in a 
large-scale, factory-type20 setting, is a relatively recent phenomenon.21 
Although the U.S. Congress enacted the federal Animal Welfare Act22 in 
1966 to provide federal protection for animals,23 it contains a specific 
exemption for farm animals.24 Thus, states retain the responsibility of 
protecting farm animals.25 Until the recent passing of Prop 226 and simi-
                                                                                                                       
products is a morally acceptable behavior, nothing will change.”); see also Gary L. Fran-
cione, What to Do on Proposition 2?, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE ABOLITIONIST APPROACH 
(Sept. 2, 2008, 4:02 AM EST), http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/what-to-do-on-
proposition-2/ (Gary Francione’s personal blog, which in this posting outlines the reasons 
why animal advocates should vote “no” for Prop 2). 
 18. California - Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/california.html. More than 8.2 million 
California voters said “yes” to Prop 2. Id.; see Lovvorn & Perry, supra note 10, at 167 
(citing Proposition 2 - Standards for Confining Farm Animals, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE 
DEBRA BROWN, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/maps/returns/props/prop-2.htm (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2010)). 
 19. For the viewpoint that Prop 2 will eliminate California industry and jobs, and will 
create less safe egg conditions, see generally Proposition 2, Standards for Confining 
Farm Animals, State of California, SMART VOTER, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, 
http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/prop/2/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2010); see 
also Michael J. Crumb, Researchers Ask: Are Caged Chickens Miserable?, ABC NEWS 
(Nov. 19, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wirestory?id=9123424&page=2 
(discussing how egg producers claim that “caged chickens are healthier and satisfied with 
the only lives they’ve ever known”). 
 20. For a discussion of large-scale factory farms, see Jim Mason, Brave New Farm? 
in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 89, 89–107 (Peter Singer ed., 1985). 
 21. See Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 11, at 95 (discussing how industrial farming 
methods that developed after World War II caused farm animal cruelty to become “em-
bedded in the methods of production themselves, and the life of each individual animal 
has become much less valuable to the producers who raise them for food”). 
 22. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159. 
 23. See 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976). 
 24. See 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)(3) (2002); see also Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 11, at 
96 (discussing how, since the U.S. does not have a federal law that protects and regulates 
the way that farmed animals are raised, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) 
cannot create regulations for farm animal welfare). 
 25. See Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 11, at 96. Additionally, egg sale regulation is 
considered to be a part of the state police power, and is valid so long as it is “intended to 
protect the public health against unwholesome eggs.” 35A AM. JUR. 2D Food § 35 (2010); 
see also Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1992). Egg sale pro-
duction regulations must also be reasonable and cannot infringe on the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Commerce Clause. 35A AM. JUR. 2D Food § 35 (2010). A law regulating the sale 
of eggs between states could be challenged under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce 
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lar statutes,27 anti-cruelty statutes were the sole means of protection for 
farmed animals, but they were extremely ineffective due to exemptions 
for “customary” farming practices,28 such as battery cage housing for 
hens.29 While similar laws previously passed in Florida,30 Arizona,31 
Oregon,32 and Colorado,33 Prop 234 is the first to create minimum farm 
animal welfare standards for battery cage hens, and thus, is ground-
breaking.35 In fact, Feedstuffs, deemed “one of the largest agribusiness 
                                                                                                                       
Clause, which gives Congress the right “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
See also Kim Walker & Jacob Bylund, California’s Prop 2: Is It Constitutional? (Com-
mentary), FEEDSTUFFS FOODLINK (Dec. 1, 2008), 
http://www.feedstuffsfoodlink.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=F4A490F89845425D8362C02
50A1FE984&nm=&type=news&mod=News&mid=9A02E3B96F2A415ABC72CB5F51
6B4C10&tier=3&nid=56A43ADC0FA34373BB2A199FC33AAFC1. 
 26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West 2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). 
 27. Maine Becomes Sixth U.S. State to Ban Extreme Confinement, HUMANE SOC’Y OF 
THE U.S. (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/ournews/maine_bans_veal_gestation_crates_051309.htm
l [hereinafter Maine]; 2009: A Record-Breaking Year of State Victories, HUMANE SOC’Y 
OF THE U.S. (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/about/departments/legislation/state_leg_victories.html 
[hereinafter Record-Breaking]. 
 28. Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 11, at 97 (discussing how, in states with these 
exceptions, farmers are able to control what is deemed to be customary). 
 29. See, e.g., David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systematic 
Abuse of Animals Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 ANIMAL L. 123, 134–5 (1996). 
Even without exemptions, states have found a host of enforcement problems when it 
comes to bringing a farm animal cruelty case. Id. For a discussion of the difficulty in a 
prosecutor’s task of bringing an anti-cruelty case, see Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 11, 
at 96. “There has not been a successful prosecution of a standard practice for the rearing 
of farmed animals in any state pursuant to a general anticruelty statute.”  Id. at 100. 
 30. Press Release, Humane Soc’y of the U.S., Voters Protect Pigs in Florida, Ban 
Cockfighting in Oklahoma, (Nov. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/press_releases/voters_protect_pigs_in_florid
a_ban_cockfighting_in_oklahoma.html. 
 31. Election ‘06: Animals Win in Arizona and Michigan, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. 
(Nov. 7, 2006), 
http://www.hsus.org/legislation_laws/ballot_initiatives/election_06_animals_win_.html. 
 32. Oregon Makes History by Banning Gestation Crates, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. 
(June 28, 2007), http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/ournews/oregon_gestation_crates.html. 
 33. Landmark Farm Animal Welfare Bill Approved in Colorado, HUMANE SOC’Y OF 
THE U.S. (May 14, 2008), 
http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/ournews/colo_gestation_crate_veal_crate_bill_051408.ht
ml. 
 34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West 2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2015). 
 35. See Lovvorn & Perry, supra note 10, at 150 (describing Prop 2 as “the most im-
portant animal law reform in the last decade”). 
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newspapers in the country,”36 states that Prop 2 will affect the production 
of livestock and poultry throughout the U.S., and possibly all of North 
America.37 Since its passing, Maine and Michigan passed similar laws, 
and Ohio negotiated an agreement between animal advocacy organiza-
tions, members of the agriculture industry, and its governor, to change 
industry practices.38 Laws are also pending before other state legisla-
tures.39 Furthermore, the Humane Society of the United States (“HSUS”) 
announced a push for federal legislation prohibiting federal programs 
from contracting with suppliers who raise animals used for meat, egg, 
and dairy products, in conditions of extreme confinement.40 
However, it is still unclear how far these humane treatment laws will 
extend. For example, some farms contest what standards are deemed ac-
ceptable by Prop 2’s requirements;41 others speculate that, due to neces-
sary cost-prohibitive renovations, they will have to “downsize or 
                                                                                                                       
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (citing Editorial, California Dam Must Not Be Breached, FEEDSTUFFS, June 
29, 2008, 
http://www.feedstuffs.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=49804C6972614A63A1A10DF54CD95
D65&nm=Search+our+Archives&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle
&mid=AA01E1C62E954234AA0052ECD5818EF4&tier=4&id=6F3F259E892B4329B8
3E0B0AAFFCE2A6 (last visited July 27, 2010)). 
 38. Maine, supra note 27; Record-Breaking, supra note 27; see Press Release, Hu-
mane Soc’y of the U.S., Landmark Ohio Animal Welfare Agreement Reached Among 
HSUS, Ohioans for Humane Farms, Gov. Strickland, and Leading Livestock Organiza-
tions, (June 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2010/06/landmark_ohio_agreement_
063010.html. 
 39. For example, a bill similar to Prop 2 is currently pending before the New York 
State Legislature. Assemb. A08163, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010). 
 40. See Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., 
http://www.humanesociety.org/action/fed_bill/farm_animals/prevention_of_farm_animal
_cruelty_act.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2010); see also H.R. 4733, 111th Cong. (2009–
2010). 
 41. J.S. West & Co., a California egg producer, built a new facility that, in its opi-
nion, meets Prop 2’s requirements: “The new enclosures provide an average of 116 
square inches of floor space per hen . . . [and] add[] features designed to meet various hen 
needs—a curtained area for nesting, a pair of metal tubes for perching and a ‘scratch pad’ 
that helps the bird clean itself.” John Holland, J.S. West Enlarges Its Hen Cages But Will 
They Comply With Space Standards?, MODESTO BEE, June 22, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.modbee.com/2010/06/21/v-print/1220229/js-west-enlarges-its-hen-
cages.html. However, HSUS believes that no confinement system will meet the require-
ments. See id. See also Press Release, Humane Soc’y of the U.S., California Egg Produc-
er Falsely Claims That Inhumane Confinement System Will Comply With Proposition 2, 
(Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/press_releases/js_west_09152009.html. 
270 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
close.”42 Furthermore, the new laws for gestation and veal crates current-
ly only apply to in-state agricultural producers, while the law regarding 
eggs was recently extended to prospectively cover the production me-
thods of all whole eggs sold in California (regardless of the state where 
they were originally produced).43 The strong public support for Prop 244 
begs the question—how much longer will American consumers continue 
to accept the production of eggs raised in intensive confinement sys-
tems?45 
Arguably one of the most significant implications of the increase in 
humane farming legislation in the U.S. is the potential impact on interna-
tional trade. The U.S. has certain international treaty obligations that it 
must uphold when trading with other countries;46 these commitments can 
be found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade47 (“GATT”), 
which is the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”)48 agreement to re-
                                                                                                                       
 42. Courtenay Edelhart, Can They Survive? Farmers Worry About Impact of Proposi-
tion 2, BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN (Nov. 7, 2008), 
http://www.bakersfield.com/news/business/economy/x1998580391/Can-they-survive-
Farmers-worry-about-impact-of-Proposition-2. 
 43. See Press Release, Humane Soc’y of the U.S., Governor Schwarzenegger Signs 
Landmark Egg Bill into Law, (July 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2010/07/ab1437_passage_070610.ht
ml. 
 44. The strong public response was demonstrated by voter turn-out in California. See 
Proposition 2 - Standards for Confining Farm Animals, supra note 18. It was also dem-
onstrated by Prop 2’s successful passage; see Californians Make History by Banning Veal 
Crates, Battery Cages, and Gestation Crates, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Nov. 4, 2008), 
http://www.hsus.org/farm/news/ournews/prop2_california_110408.html; and subsequent 
similar bills in other states; see, e.g., Maine, supra note 27. 
 45. “[M]ore than four-fifths of Americans believe there should be effective laws that 
protect farm animals against cruelty, and nearly three-quarters believe there ought to be 
federal inspections of farms to ensure humane treatment.” Lovvorn & Perry, supra note 
10, at 153 (citing ZOGBY INT’L, NATIONWIDE VIEWS ON THE TREATMENT OF FARM 
ANIMALS 6 (2003), available at http://civileats.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/AWT-
final-poll-report-10-22.pdf). 
 46. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
102 (2008) (discussing how “[e]ach member of the WTO that undertakes an international 
trade obligation has a duty to transform and implement that obligation in its domestic 
legal order”). However, WTO agreements have been defined as “non-self-executing 
agreements,” which means they do not automatically take effect in U.S. law. Id. at 133, 
137. 
 47. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 48. The WTO was created to “provide the common institutional framework for the 
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and 
associated legal instruments.” Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, art. 2. 
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duce trade barriers for goods.49 According to the Vienna Convention,50 
which contains rules governing treaty enforcement,51 treaties must be 
“interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object 
and purpose.”52 Furthermore, “[s]ince clarity and predictability are goals 
of the dispute settlement system,53 WTO [dispute settlement] Panels have 
consistently said that the Vienna Convention is the tool they use to in-
terpret the GATT.”54 
Importantly, the GATT’s goal of reducing trade barriers through its 
various provisions, as interpreted by the Vienna Convention, could con-
flict with potential new animal welfare standards that lay out new expec-
tations for both domestic and foreign producers. However, the fact that 
the U.S. and other countries are beginning to recognize and promote an-
imal welfare standards,55 suggests that as countries begin to modify their 
own measures at home, they will demand similar measures from their 
trading partners as well.56 In turn, this may place pressure on the WTO to 
                                                                                                                       
 49. See id. 
 50. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 51. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 46, at 9. 
 52. Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 31(1). 
 53. A WTO dispute settlement panel decides whether a nation has violated one of its 
obligations under the GATT. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 46, at 52–53. If so, 
the WTO recommends that the violating country “bring its non-conforming measure into 
compliance with the WTO.” Id. The WTO has also created an Appellate Body to review 
Panel decisions. Id. at 53. 
 54. Peter C. Maki, Note, Interpreting GATT Using the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties: A Method to Increase the Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System, 9 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 343, 352 (2000). 
 55. An example worthy of recognition is the European Union (“EU”), which passed 
the EU Laying Hens Directive in 1999, requiring a ban on battery cages for all hen-laying 
eggs in the EU by 2012. Council Directive 99/74, 1999 O.J. (L 203/53), amended by 
Council Regulation 806/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 122) (EC); see also 2012 EU Battery Cage 
Ban Will Be Upheld, COMPASSION IN WORLD FARMING (Jan. 10, 2008), 
http://www.ciwf.org.uk/news/laying_hens/cage_ban_will_be_upheld.aspx. Labour Mem-
ber of the European Parliament (“MEP”) Mark Watts stated, “It is a myth that consumers 
won’t buy free-range eggs. The fact is that 89% of the British public believe [sic] keeping 
hens in small cages is cruel . . . .” EU Bans Battery Hen Cages, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 28, 
1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/264607.stm. 
 56. See, e.g., Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, 
and Trade, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 349 (2007) (citing Committee on Agricul-
ture Special Session, European Communities Proposal: Animal Welfare and Trade in 
Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/19 (June 28, 2000), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ngw19_e.doc) (“‘[A]nimal welfare standards . . . 
could be undermined if there is no way of ensuring that agricultural and food products 
produced to domestic animal welfare standards are not simply replaced by imports pro-
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accept animal welfare standards as complying with GATT trading obli-
gations. Further, this trend suggests that animal welfare may begin to 
play a role in determining trade rules between countries, or at the very 
least, may begin to have a presence amidst trade discussions, concerns, 
and objectives.57 However, when analyzing a dispute between nations, it 
is still unclear if a WTO dispute settlement panel would see a trade re-
striction such as a countrywide ban on the production and importation of 
battery cage eggs, as a violation of WTO obligations. The WTO should 
accept and recognize such a restriction as complying with the GATT, due 
to the fact that the purpose of such a measure coincides with the plain 
meaning and purpose of certain GATT provisions. 
Part I of this Note analyzes the U.S.’s trade obligations under the 
GATT. Part II discusses the potential ability of various GATT provisions 
to support a trade measure banning battery cage eggs. Part III discusses 
the U.S.’s potential ability to create such an animal welfare provision, 
while upholding its obligations in the Agreements annexed to the GATT. 
The Note concludes that an appropriately tailored animal welfare meas-
ure banning battery cages for hens should be able to survive under the 
GATT and its annexed agreements. 
I. CURRENT LAY OF THE LAND: AN ANALYSIS OF TWO WTO 
TRADING OBLIGATIONS 
While seemingly removed from farm animal welfare issues, trade 
agreements have the ability to bring about significant animal welfare 
reform in the agricultural industry.58 Currently, the WTO can be seen as 
both a friend and a foe to initiatives seeking to improve animal welfare in 
                                                                                                                       
duced to lower standards’”). The EU has begun to provide for animal welfare provisions 
in some of its free trade agreements. Improving Animal Welfare: EU Action Plan, 
POULTRY SITE (Jan. 2006), http://www.thepoultrysite.com/articles/511/improving-animal-
welfare-eu-action-plan. Two examples of such agreements are between the EU and Can-
ada, and the EU and Chile. Id. Free trade agreements are permissible under the GATT, 
Article XXIV.4. GATT, supra note 47, art. XXIV.4. 
 57. See, e.g., USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN REPORT, EU HOSTS GLOBAL 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND FARM ANIMAL WELFARE (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200902/146327292.pdf (discussing the January 2009 
European Commission’s conference regarding international trade and farm animal wel-
fare). 
 58. See DAVID S. FAVRE, Agricultural Animals, in ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, 
INTERESTS, AND RIGHTS 287, 315 (2008). The international trade problems surrounding a 
country’s decision to restrict imports that do not meet the country’s animal welfare stan-
dards, have already been contemplated. See Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56. However, 
their argument focuses more on the potential for change through consumer and retailer 
campaigns. Id. 
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farming practices.59 The GATT contains many obligations for member 
countries that restrict the way that products can be differentiated. For 
example, under Article I(1),60 the Most-Favored Nation (“MFN”) clause, 
and Article III(1),61 the National Treatment clause, a WTO member can-
not treat “like” products62 from other WTO member countries less favor-
ably than the same products from any other country,63 or less favorably 
than its own domestic products.64 These obligations limit WTO mem-
bers’ abilities to create trade restrictions on battery cage eggs. 
Article I’s MFN principle mandates that “any advantage, favour, privi-
lege or immunity” granted by a WTO member to another country’s 
product “shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally” by that 
WTO member to any other WTO member’s like product.65 In essence, 
instead of permitting one country to bestow special treatment on another 
country, MFN requires equal treatment for all WTO members.66 Article 
III contains the National Treatment principle, which mandates that inter-
nal charges cannot be applied in a way “so as to afford protection to do-
mestic production.”67 It is important to emphasize that in both MFN and 
National Treatment, the principles only prohibit discrimination against 
“like” products.68 While at first glance, it may appear that the differing 
                                                                                                                       
 59. Critics have focused on the WTO’s support of “industrial farming by virtue of 
reducing trade barriers for large farms. On the other hand . . . the WTO is focused on the 
eventual eradication of subsidies that make these horrific factory farms competitive with 
traditional animal farming, or indeed enable factory farms to continue operating at all.” 
Kyle Ash, Why “Managing” Biodiversity Will Fail: An Alternative Approach to Sustain-
able Exploitation for International Law, 13 ANIMAL L. 209, 221 (2007). 
 60. GATT, supra note 47, art. I.1. 
 61. Id. art. III.1. 
 62. An examination of whether products are “like” products is conducted case-by-
case with several considerations, such as “the product’s end-uses in a given market; con-
sumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s proper-
ties, nature, and quality.” Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 18, 
L/3464 (Dec. 2. 1970). 
 63. GATT, supra note 47, art. I.1. 
 64. Id. art. III.1. 
 65. Id. art. I.1. 
 66. See, e.g. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 143 (2003). 
 67. GATT, supra note 47, art. III.1. Through Article III, MFN also incorporates equal 
treatment for “internal taxes and other internal charges.” Id. art. III.2. 
 68. See, e.g. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 66, at 150. What constitutes “like” prod-
ucts under the MFN principle is deemed case-by-case, but the analysis can include look-
ing at the products’ tariff classifications, product end uses, physical characteristics, and 
consumer tastes. See id. at 150–1. What constitutes “like” products under the National 
Treatment principle is deemed case-by-case, and it can include the same analyses as 
MFN, as well as whether the two products are “directly competitive or substitutable 
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manners in which products are produced (such as eggs from battery cag-
es and eggs from cage-free facilities) change them so that they are not 
“like” one another, these differences are considered to be “processes and 
production methods” (“PPMs”),69 which generally do not change a prod-
uct’s likeness to another product.70 
In The World Trade Organisation Rules: A Legal Analysis of Their 
Adverse Impact on Animal Welfare,71 Peter Stevenson cites two WTO 
Panel reports, the Tuna-Dolphin cases,72 that demonstrate how the WTO 
has held that two commodities (in this case, tuna caught in seine nets, 
which cause high mortality rates amongst dolphins (“non-dolphin-safe 
nets”), and tuna caught in nets designed to reduce dolphin mortality rates 
(“dolphin-safe nets”)), are the same product, and cannot be distinguished 
from one another based on the way they are caught.73 Specifically, the 
first Panel held that Article III requires “a comparison of the treatment of 
imported tuna as a product with that of domestic tuna as a prod-
uct. Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking 
of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product.”74 GATT Panel re-
ports like those from the Tuna/Dolphin cases75 articulate that a country 
cannot take into account the way that a product is produced when deter-
                                                                                                                       
product[s].” GATT, supra note 47, art. Annex I, Ad Article III.2; see also id. arts. I.1, 
III.2, III.4; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 66, at 159–160. 
 69. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 66, at 461. 
 70. See, e.g., id. “Some PPMs are related directly to the characteristics of the products 
concerned. For example, pesticides used on food crops produce residues on food products 
. . . Other PPMs, however, are not reflected in the characteristics of the associated prod-
uct . . . [and] probably cannot be justified under [the other WTO Agreements].” Id. at 
461–2; see also FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DEVELOPING ANIMAL 
WELFARE: THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADE IN HIGH WELFARE PRODUCTS FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005), available at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/animalwelfare/Developing%20country%20rep
ort.pdf  (discussing how almost all animal welfare concerns stem from manners of pro-
ducing a product, which cannot be seen in the final product, and how “[i]t is generally 
presumed that product distinctions based on such PPMs conflict with Article III of the . . . 
GATT[]”). 
 71. Peter Stevenson, The World Trade Organisation Rules: A Legal Analysis of Their 
Adverse Impact on Animal Welfare, 8 ANIMAL L. 107 (2002). 
 72. Id. at 111 (citing Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
WT/DS 21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I]; Panel Report, United States – 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS29/R (Jun. 16, 1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin 
II]. Neither panel report was adopted by the GATT Council. Stevenson, supra note 71, at 
111, n. 24, 26. 
 73. See Stevenson, supra note 71, at 114. 
 74. Id. (citing Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 72, ¶ 5.15). 
 75. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 72; Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 72. 
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mining if it is “like” another product,76 because the production method 
does not change the end product.77 Furthermore, whether or not a product 
is “like” another product is “fundamentally, a determination about the 
nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among prod-
ucts.”78 For example, tuna products caught in non-dolphin-safe nets are 
seen as directly competing in the marketplace with tuna products that are 
caught in dolphin-safe nets. Therefore, the WTO reasons that despite 
having different PPMs, these tuna products are “like” products.79 In fact, 
no GATT Panel has thus far allowed a country to distinguish “like” 
products based on differing PPMs (with the exception of differing PPMs 
that can cause severe health risks).80 
However, there is a strong argument that eggs produced by battery 
cage hens and eggs produced by cage-free hens undergo such vastly dif-
ferent production methods, that they should not be considered “like” 
products. 81 The analysis of whether two products are “like” one another 
is dependent—at least in part—upon consumer preferences,82 since “con-
sumers’ tastes and habits are one of the key elements in the competitive 
relationship between products in the marketplace.”83 Importantly, con-
sumers who buy cage-free eggs do not see these two products as “like” 
one another,84 since they make the conscious decision to buy one product 
based on its more “humane” production method.85 Furthermore, if hens 
                                                                                                                       
 76. See Stevenson, supra note 71, at 110; see also Catherine Jean Archibald, Forbid-
den By the WTO? Discrimination Against A Product When Its Creation Causes Harm to 
the Environment or Animal Welfare, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 15, 17 (2008) (discussing 
how the “Tuna/Dolphin I dispute panel held that an environmentally and animal-welfare 
motivated PPM distinction was forbidden by the world trading regime”). 
 77. See, e.g., Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 72, ¶ 5.15. 
 78. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 99, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter 
Asbestos]. 
 79. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 72, ¶ 5.15. 
 80. See generally Asbestos, supra note 78. 
 81. See Stevenson, supra note 71, at 111. 
 82. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 66, at 151. 
 83. Stevenson, supra note 71, at 117; see also Asbestos, supra note 78, ¶ 117. 
 84. See Peter Singer & Jim Mason, Introduction: Food and Ethics, in THE WAY WE 
EAT: WHY OUR FOOD CHOICES MATTER 4 (2006) (discussing various reasons, for exam-
ple, why consumers choose to purchase organic food, from “an ethical concern for the 
environment to a desire to avoid ingesting pesticides and the conviction that organic food 
tastes better than food from conventional sources”); see also Stevenson, supra note 71, at 
111. 
 85. See Archibald, supra note 76, at 45–46 (discussing how “the words ‘like prod-
ucts’ should not refer to two products whose production methods result in vastly different 
‘ecological footprints’ . . . . “); see also Stevenson, supra note 71, at 120–121 (holding 
that in the future, the WTO could rule “that, despite being physically identical or similar, 
276 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
are fed grass at pasture (as opposed to a seed diet in battery cages) they 
arguably produce a healthier egg.86 Since consumers treat these two 
products (battery cage and cage-free eggs) differently, the WTO should 
follow suit. However, past Panel decisions have given no indication that 
future Panels will consider PPMs as affecting products’ likeness to one 
another.87 
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GATT AGREEMENT AND ANIMAL 
WELFARE MEASURES UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS ARTICLE 
Historically, the GATT treated measures made in pursuit of animal 
welfare goals unfavorably;88 however, some GATT provisions actually 
indicate that such measures should be protected.89 Even if a country’s 
trade measure violates a trading obligation, such as MFN or National 
Treatment, it may be upheld as a permissible exception under GATT Ar-
ticle XX,90 arguably one of the most important Articles in the GATT.91 
This exceptions provision allows, in “certain circumstances, legitimate 
public policy considerations other than trade liberalisation to take prece-
                                                                                                                       
two products are not ‘like’ each other because a significant number of consumers in fact 
view them as being different . . . . [I]n an increasing number of countries . . . consumers 
distinguish between products derived from cruel practice and those coming from more 
humane practices”); see also Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 350. 
 86. See MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD 167–168 (2008). Pollan argues that 
for most animals who are fed grass, the result is animal products with “healthier fats . . . 
as well as . . . higher levels of vitamins and antioxidants . . . [Though grass-fed and seed-
fed products look the same,] they are for all intents and purposes two completely differ-
ent foods.” Id. Importantly, Pollan notes that “free-range” hens do not necessarily have 
access to fresh grass. Id. at 168. 
 87. See, e.g., Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 72, ¶ 5.15. 
 88. See Stevenson, supra note 71, at 109 (discussing how GATT rules make it diffi-
cult for WTO members to introduce animal welfare measures, because “under GATT 
rules the E.U. cannot prohibit the importation of meat derived from animals reared in 
non-E.U. countries [in cruel manners] . . . . GATT rules act as a powerful disincentive to 
the E.U. to prohibit the system within its own territory”). 
 89. See GATT, supra note 47, art. XX. But see Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 
325 (arguing that “[a]lthough recognition in trade agreements and restrictions on sale 
could help to protect animal welfare, they may rarely be politically feasible”). 
 90. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX. 
 91. See, e.g., Hal S. Shapiro, The Rules That Swallowed the Exceptions: The WTO 
SPS Agreement and Its Relationship to GATT Articles XX and XXI: The Threat of the 
EU-GMO Dispute, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 199, 200 (2007) (discussing how this 
exception is linked to “some of the most powerful political and policy debates connected 
to the WTO—i.e, whether the WTO is sufficiently sensitive to labor, environmental, 
human rights and other issues”). 
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dence over the free trade requirements of the main GATT articles.”92 
When analyzing a country’s trade measure under Article XX, the WTO 
must first look at the particular provision of the Article, to see if the 
measure appropriately fits under the provision’s described exception;93 
then, the WTO analyzes the measure under the “chapeau”94 of Article 
XX to ensure that the measure is not “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation . . . or a disguised restriction on international trade.”95 The cha-
peau is important for its role in helping to “rein in national abuse of the 
exceptions.”96 There are three different provisions within Article XX that 
could potentially be used to protect an animal welfare measure from vio-
lating the GATT. 
A. Article XX(g): Exception for Exhaustible Natural Resources 
Article XX(g) is most likely the weakest of the three potential provi-
sions to support a battery cage ban. This provision allows WTO members 
to enact measures applying to both foreign and domestic products, in 
order to conserve “exhaustible natural resources.”97 However, it has been 
analyzed by GATT Panels and the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle 
cases98 in a way that is favorable for only some animal welfare meas-
ures.99 In Shrimp/Turtle I, the Panel recounts how the U.S. passed a regu-
lation in 1987100 that required shrimp trawling fishermen to use certain 
methods to decrease turtle mortality caused by traditional shrimp trawl-
                                                                                                                       
 92. Stevenson, supra note 71, at 128. “Increased trade liberalization may be the goal 
of the WTO, but the organization understands that competing interests should be recog-
nized.” Colm Patrick McInerney, From Shrimps and Dolphins to Retreaded Tyres: An 
Overview of the World Trade Organization Disputes, Discussing Exceptions to Trading 
Rules, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 153, 158–9 (2009). 
 93. See, e.g., Asbestos, supra note 78, ¶ 155. 
 94. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 147, 150, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 
Shrimp/Turtle II]. The “chapeau” is “[t]he introductory section of Article XX.” CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 46, at 491. 
 95. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX. 
 96. Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Dis-
guised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 851 
(2001). 
 97. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(g). 
 98. See Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle I]; 
Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 94; Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia I]. 
 99. See, e.g., Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia I, supra note 98. 
 100. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 98, ¶ 2.6; see also 50 C.F.R. §§ 217, 222, 227. 
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ing.101 In 1989, the U.S. passed Public Law 609,102 which prohibited the 
importation of shrimp products that had been harvested with fishing 
technology that adversely affected sea turtles.103 Malaysia, India, Paki-
stan, and Thailand challenged this law before the WTO,104 and after an 
appeal, the Appellate Body found that the measure did not fit within any 
Article XX exception, due to the fact that it created “arbitrary or unjusti-
fied discrimination.”105 Consequently, the U.S. changed its law to man-
date shrimping in a manner that was “comparable in effectiveness” (but 
not exactly the same) as that of the U.S.106 Malaysia again brought an 
action before the WTO in Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia I, but the Panel and 
subsequent Appellate Body (Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II) found the re-
vised U.S. law to be non-discriminatory.107 This holding significantly 
deviated from the previous cases in that it allowed the U.S. to restrict 
                                                                                                                       
 101. The regulation required shrimp trawling fishermen to use Turtle Excluder Devices 
(“TEDs”) or tow time restrictions “in specified areas where there was a significant mor-
tality of sea turtles.” Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 98, ¶ 2.6. “A TED is a grid trapdoor 
installed inside a [shrimp] trawling net . . . to allow shrimp to pass to the back of the net 
while directing sea turtles . . . out of the net.” Id. n. 613. The WTO Panel noted that all 
marine turtles (which are migratory creatures), were considered to be endangered species 
by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 3.9(d). 
 102. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–162 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 
(1989)); see also Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 98, ¶ 2.7. Public Law 609 did permit shrimp 
trawling measures taken by a nation if the nation had a comparable regulatory program 
and incidental take rate to the U.S., or if it had a fishing environment that did not “not 
pose a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting.”  
Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 94, ¶ 3. The U.S. subsequently passed guidelines in 1991 
and 1993 which assessed how foreign regulatory programs compared to those of the U.S. 
Id. ¶¶ 3–4. After the US Court of International Trade (“CIT”) found the guidelines to be 
“contrary to law,” the U.S. modified them in 1996. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 98, ¶¶ 
2.10, 2.11. 
 103. 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1989). 
 104. The countries argued that the law was not covered by Article XX(b) or XX(g) 
exceptions, and that the law effectively “nullified or impaired benefits” owed to the coun-
tries. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 98, ¶ 3.1. 
 105. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 98, ¶ 5.394. 
 106. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 5, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II]; see also Arc-
hibald, supra note 76, at 46. 
 107. However, the Appellate Body held that the U.S. needed to continue “ongoing 
serious, good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement” with other nations regarding 
how to protect the turtles. Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, supra note 106, ¶ 152; see also 
Archibald, supra note 76, at 46. 
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trade based on the objective of protecting a natural resource,108 albeit not 
in an unjustifiable or arbitrarily discriminatory manner.109 
Some argue that the Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II decision should extend 
to future cases and the WTO should “interpret any ambiguities in the 
regime in a way that is favourable to protecting the environment and/or 
animal welfare.”110 The impact of Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II should not 
be understated; it was the first time in GATT and WTO history that a 
“unilateral extraterritorial national measure was upheld on environmental 
grounds.”111 The Shrimp/Turtle decisions demonstrate that a country can 
restrict or ban foreign products to conserve “exhaustible natural re-
sources”112 if the restriction is concurrent with similar domestic restric-
tions,113 and indicates that a country may be able to exert some control 
over PPMs.114 
However, the decision’s usefulness in relation to a battery cage egg 
ban may be limited. A dispute settlement panel would be unlikely to ex-
tend the Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II holding, which affected an endan-
gered species,115 to farm animals such as egg-laying hens that eventually 
                                                                                                                       
 108. Archibald, supra note 76, at 47–48. 
 109. Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, supra note 106; see also Archibald, supra note 76, at 
48. Archibald stresses that if a country wants to create a measure restricting trade for the 
conservation of a natural resource, the country should ensure that the standards that the 
foreign country has to meet are “no harsher” than the domestic standards; that the country 
“attempt[s] to start . . . negotiations . . . ha[s] full transparency of the decision-making 
process . . . [and has flexible standards]  so that a country . . . [can] meet the environmen-
tal or animal welfare goal through different methods than those used by the importing and 
restricting country.” Id. 
 110. Archibald, supra note 76, at 18. 
 111. Id. at 47; see also Andres Rueda, Shrimp and Turtles: What About Environmental 
Embargoes Under NAFTA?, in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 519, 537 (Edith 
Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001) (discussing how environmentally, “the 
Shrimp-Turtle decision is almost unprecedented. It allows for the imposition of unilateral 
sanctions for extraterritorial, process-related reasons, provided that certain basic condi-
tions are met”). 
 112. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(g). 
 113. Archibald, supra note 76, at 48. But see Gaines, supra note 96, at 804 (“By disqu-
alifying under the Article XX chapeau any measure that has the result of applying the 
economic pressure of a trade restriction on other governments unless they change their 
resource conservation policies, the Appellate Body effectively nullified Article XX(g)”). 
 114. See Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia I, supra note 98. For a criticism of the two 
Shrimp/Turtle decisions and the idea that “the latest [Shrimp/Turtle decisions] establish a 
WTO rule that imposes extraordinary preconditions on member governments before they 
resort to Article XX for environmental measures,” see Gaines, supra note 96, at 745. 
 115. Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, supra note 106. 
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will be killed for food.116 The fact that hens are nowhere near species 
exhaustion117 suggests that a dispute settlement panel may not interpret 
this provision to protect an animal welfare measure for cage-free eggs. 
However, the “exhaustible natural resources” provision118 applies to 
more than just endangered species. In fact, in compliance with the Vi-
enna Convention’s treaty interpretation method, according to the ordi-
nary meaning of the treaty’s words,119 a farm animal like a hen can be 
considered a “natural resource.”120 Furthermore, under XX(g), the meas-
ure does not need to be “necessary” for conserving the natural resource, 
as is the case for some other Article XX measures;121 it must simply “re-
late to” conserving the natural resource.122 In sum, XX(g) could still be 
an option, but other provisions may provide stronger support. 
B. Article XX(b): Exceptions for Human, Animal, and Plant Health 
Unlike Article XX(g), Article XX(b) may be more successfully used to 
uphold a trade measure differentiating between farm products that are 
produced more humanely than others. This provision allows WTO mem-
bers to enact measures “necessary to protect . . . animal . . . health.”123 It 
is unclear whether a dispute settlement panel would interpret a measure 
banning battery cages for hens (in order to protect their welfare) as re-
lated to animal health; “the argument that animal health includes animal 
                                                                                                                       
 116. Compare Archibald, supra note 76, at 50 (noting that the Shrimp/Turtle decisions 
“leave open the question as to whether a measure that protects the welfare of a non-
endangered species would receive as much protection as a measure that protects an en-
dangered species”), with Stevenson, supra note 71, at 141 (“One must be careful not to 
extrapolate too far from the latest Shrimp-Turtle decisions as that case involves an en-
dangered species, seen by some as more worthy of protection than non-endangered ani-
mals”). 
 117. See Sullivan & Wolfson, supra note 11 (“It is hard to comprehend the number of 
animals killed for food in the United States. More than ten billion animals (excluding 
fish) die every year”). 
 118. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(g). 
 119. Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 31(1). 
 120. “Natural resource” is defined as “[a] material source of wealth, such as timber, 
fresh water, or a mineral deposit, that occurs in a natural state and has economic value.” 
Renewable Energy Program: Definitions, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG., & 
ENFORCEMENT: OFFSHORE ENERGY & MINERALS MGMT., 
http://www.boemre.gov/offshore/RenewableEnergy/Definitions.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 
2010). 
 121. See, e.g., GATT supra note 47, arts. XX(a), XX(b). 
 122. Stevenson, supra note 71, at 127; GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(g). 
 123. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(b). 
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welfare . . . has not yet been fully established or accepted.”124 Additional-
ly, previous GATT Panels have seen Article XX(b) as relating solely to 
“animal life and health” and not animal welfare.125 This ambiguity, as to 
whether the WTO intended animal “health” to encompass animal “wel-
fare,” could lead some critics to allege that this provision was not meant 
to protect the welfare of all animals. This sentiment is illustrated by the 
fact that some countries, like the U.S., have federal laws purporting to 
protect the welfare of all animals, but these laws specifically exempt 
farmed animals from their protection.126 Traditionally, the WTO limits 
its recognition of animal health provisions to those regarding disease 
prevention and food product safety for humans.127 
Additionally, it is unclear if a panel would interpret Article XX(b) as 
permitting Country A to enact a trade measure that would protect the 
welfare of hens in Country B (based on the idea that the eggs will even-
tually be imported into Country A).128 In Tuna-Dolphin I, the Panel held 
                                                                                                                       
 124. FAVRE, supra note 58. However, at least one international body believes that there 
is a link between animal health and animal welfare. See The OIE’s Objectives and 
Achievements in Animal Welfare, WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://www.oie.int/Eng/bien_etre/en_introduction.htm [hereinafter The OIE’s Objectives]. 
 125. Edward M. Thomas, Note, Playing Chicken at the WTO: Defending an Animal 
Welfare-Based Trade Restriction Under GATT’s Moral Exception, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 605, 618 (2007); see also Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 350. 
 126. See 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)(3) (2002): 
. . . (g) The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman 
primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded an-
imal . . . but such term excludes . . . . 
. . . 
(3) other farm animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used or 
intended for use as food or fiber . . . . “ 
See also Mariann Sullivan & David J. Wolfson, What’s Good for the Goose . . . The 
Israeli Supreme Court, Foie Gras, and the Future of Farmed Animals in the United 
States, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 139 (2007) [hereinafter What’s Good for the 
Goose] (discussing how “laws [in the U.S.] that govern the welfare of these animals have 
been altered to exempt cruel common practices or, when it comes to such practices, 
[they] are simply ignored”). 
 127. Thomas, supra note 125, at 618; see also Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 
350. In his article, Peter Stevenson does make the argument, though, that Article XX(b) 
should be expanded so that measures can be adopted for animal welfare. Stevenson, su-
pra note 71, at 135–36. 
 128. “One major problem with Article XX is the ‘rule’ on extra-territoriality. The gen-
eral position is that a WTO member nation may act to protect animals within its own 
territory but, generally, not those located outside its territorial jurisdiction . . . [however, 
this position is not] clear-cut and absolute.” Stevenson, supra note 71, at 122. 
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that Article XX(b) should be interpreted to allow a country to protect 
health only inside its own borders, because if a country was allowed to 
protect health outside of its borders, “each contracting party could unila-
terally determine the life or health protection policies from which other 
contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights 
under the General Agreement.”129 Further, a measure protected by Ar-
ticle XX(b) must be deemed “necessary”130 in order to be upheld—this is 
a difficult standard to meet, since “any number of hypothetical policies 
could fulfill a social objective without trade restrictions, even if such pol-
icies are unrealistic.”131 
However, regardless of these problems, a future Panel should find that 
Article XX(b) can uphold a battery cage ban. While “‘[w]elfare’ is a 
broader term than ‘health,’”132 the International Office of Epizootics 
(“OIE”)133 sets international standards for The Agreement on the Appli-
cation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”),134 
which is annexed to the GATT (and discussed in Part III of this Note),135 
and has deemed the terms to be interconnected.136 As will be discussed, 
the connection between Article XX(b) and the SPS Agreement,137 as well 
as the current enhancements being made to the SPS Agreement, streng-
then the case that animal welfare is related to animal health (and thus an 
animal welfare measure should be protected by Article XX(b)). Addi-
tionally, research has been conducted to show that battery cages prohibit 
hens from engaging in their normal behaviors and cause them to have 
                                                                                                                       
 129. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 72, ¶ 5.27; see also Archibald, supra note 76, at 32. 
 130. Stevenson, supra note 71, at 135 (citing Panel Report on United States—Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.26, (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 
(1990)). 
 131. Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 350. 
 132. Stevenson, supra note 71, at 136. 
 133. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL 
HEALTH, http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en_about.htm?e1d1 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
 134. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1165 (1994) [hereinafter 
SPS]. 
 135. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 136. See, e.g., WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE 
§7.1.2.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.1.htm [hereinafter TERRESTRIAL 
ANIMAL HEALTH CODE] (the OIE recognizes that “there is a critical relationship between 
animal health and animal welfare”). 
 137. See SPS, supra note 134, Annex A(1). 
2010] FARMING PRACTICES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 283 
health and psychological problems.138 Also, based on the ordinary mean-
ing of Article XX(b), there is no indication of an intention to only allow 
a country to protect animal health within its borders,139 and throughout 
history, countries have enacted trade measures which have the effect of 
controlling production in other countries.140 Finally, a battery cage ban is 
“necessary” to protect animal welfare, since the battery cage production 
method itself has a detrimental effect on hens.141 
However, a dispute settlement panel may give great weight to the 
monetary burden that such a production change would place on another 
country, particularly a developing country. Two disputes brought before 
the Appellate Body, one using Article XX(b) successfully as a defense142 
and another using Article XX(g) successfully as a defense,143 demon-
                                                                                                                       
 138. See, e.g., SARAH SHIELDS & IAN J.H. DUNCAN, AN HSUS REPORT: A COMPARISON 
OF THE WELFARE OF HENS IN BATTERY CAGES AND ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS, HUMANE 
SOC’Y OF THE U.S. 1, 4, available at http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/hsus-a-
comparison-of-the-welfare-of-hens-in-battery-cages-and-alternative-systems.pdf: 
Cages prevent hens from performing the bulk of their natural behavior, 
including nesting, perching, dustbathing, scratching, foraging, exercis-
ing, running, jumping, flying, stretching, wing-flapping, and freely 
walking. Cages also lead to severe disuse osteoporosis due to lack of 
exercise. Alternative, cage-free systems allow hens to move freely 
through their environment and engage in most of the behavior thwarted 
by battery-system confinement . . . all caged hens are permanently de-
nied the opportunity to express most of their basic behavior . . . [t]he 
science is clear that this deprivation represents a serious inherent wel-
fare disadvantage compared to any cage-free production system . . . 
Barren, restrictive environments are detrimental to the psychological 
well-being of an animal.  
Id. 
See also Stevenson, supra note 71, at 136. 
 139. See, e.g., Archibald, supra note 76, at 32 (arguing that “[t]he plain reading of 
[Article XX] sets no limits and instead lets each country decide which life or health it 
wishes to protect”); see also GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(b). 
 140. See Archibald, supra note 76, at 32 (discussing how throughout history, before 
GATT negotiations, “countries were using trade bans to protect the environment . . . 
beyond their borders . . . .”). 
 141. See, e.g., Shields & Duncan, supra note 138. 
 142. In Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body 
“stated that when a complaining member presents an alternative measure, the responding 
member mus [sic] have the capabilities to enact it.”  McInerney, supra note 92, at 200; 
see also Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
¶ 156, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 143. In Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, the Appellate Body states that a country’s trade 
measure that is protected under Article XX “should take account of differing technology 
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strate that the WTO will seriously consider the implications of a trade 
restriction on a developing country, even if it is otherwise appropriate 
under Article XX. In both cases, the Appellate Body considered the 
greater difficulty that developing countries may have in implementing 
animal welfare trade measures, but ultimately, concluded that the trade 
measures could succeed, as long as they were not too constrictive.144 
With a battery cage ban, the alleged “costs” may not be as constrictive 
as critics assume. For example, developing countries may be better 
equipped to implement animal welfare standards than even some devel-
oped countries, due to the fact that more humane production methods are 
generally more “labor-intensive”145 and developing countries tend to 
have cheaper labor costs than developed countries.146 If the U.S. was to 
enact a trade measure that only sanctioned certain types of egg produc-
tion for animal welfare-related reasons, it would need to acknowledge 
developing countries’ abilities to implement and enforce such a measure, 
and consequently would need to be flexible due to these differing abili-
ties. If the U.S. created a battery cage ban with these considerations in 
mind, Article XX(b) should be able to defend such a measure. 
C. Article XX(a): The Public Morals Exception 
Article XX(a), which allows WTO members to create measures “ne-
cessary to protect public morals,”147 should also support a battery cage 
egg ban. While this provision has only been used on rare occasions,148 
trade restrictions in favor of more humane practices may be covered149 as 
a result of society’s views on the need to treat animals humanely.150 In 
                                                                                                                       
levels of other members trying to meet the standard and should provide sufficient flex-
ibility to do so.” McInerney, supra note 92, at 199–200; see also Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia 
II, supra note 106, ¶ 149. 
 144. See generally Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, supra note 
142; Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, supra note 106. 
 145. Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 353 (discussing how “less-abusive produc-
tion methods tend to be more labor-intensive while [common intensive farming] systems 
are more capital-intensive). 
 146. Id. (discussing how cheaper labor could give developing countries “a comparative 
advantage in satisfying the demand for welfare-enhanced meat, eggs, and milk”). 
 147. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(a). 
 148. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 91, at 215. 
 149. See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 96, at 799 (discussing how Article XX(a) may allow 
“a country to protect its ‘public morals’ against the effects of trade—most likely imported 
products—that undercut its own moral preferences within its borders . . . . “). 
 150. See, e.g., Joseph Vining, Animal Cruelty Laws and Factory Farming, 106 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 123, 123 (2008) (discussing the U.S.’s “background public 
policy of humane treatment of sentient creatures . . . .”). 
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fact, the public morals provision may soon be invoked with regard to two 
recent requests for WTO dispute settlement consultations launched by 
Canada and Norway (non-EU members)151 against the EU for its ban on 
imported seal products, which began in August 2010.152 Canada and 
Norway allege that the ban violates the EU’s trade obligations under the 
WTO.153 The EU defends its ban based on public outrage over the cruel-
ty associated with seal slaughtering practices;154 in his expert submission 
to the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection, Jacques Bourgeios said, “It is fairly easy to dem-
onstrate that the inhumane killing and skinning of seals is a matter of 
[European] public morality.”155 However, to meet XX(a)’s standards, the 
EU’s ban must also be “necessary” to the protection of public morals and 
must meet the chapeau’s requirements.156 Humane Society International 
                                                                                                                       
 151. See European Commission External Relations: Norway, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/norway/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). 
 152. See Canada, Norway Launch WTO Complaint Over EU Seal Ban, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Nov.13, 2009) [hereinafter Canada, Norway], available 
at http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/59391/. The ban prohibits trade with “commercial sealing 
operations,” but exempts non-commercial trading in Inuit communities. Id. 
 153. Id. Presumably, Canada and Norway will challenge the ban based on GATT Ar-
ticle XI, which prohibits restrictions on a country’s number of imports. See Robert Galan-
tucci, Compassionate Consumerism Within the GATT Regime: Can Belgium’s Ban on 
Seal Product Imports Be Justified Under Article XX?, 39 CAL W. INT’L L. J. 281, 286 
(2009). 
 154. See, e.g., EU Ban Looms Over Seal Products, BBC NEWS EUROPE (May 5, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8033498.stm (quoting MEP Arlene McCarthy as say-
ing that the majority of Europeans “‘are horrified by the cruel clubbing to death of seals 
and this law will finally put an end to the cruel cull.’” Furthermore, “anti-hunt campaign-
ers say some seals are skinned while still conscious. Hunters typically shoot the seals 
with rifles or bludgeon them to death with spiked clubs.”). 
 155. JACQUES BOURGEOIS, WRITTEN EXPERT SUBMISSION TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
INTERNAL MARKET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE 
PROPOSED REGULATION CONCERNING TRADE IN SEAL PRODUCTS, EUR. PARL., (2009), 
available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200901/20090130ATT47720/20
090130ATT47720EN.pdf. The ban may also be defended under the Technical Barriers to 
Trade (“TBT”) Agreement, which allows a WTO member to restrict trade in order ac-
complish a “legitimate objective.” Id.; see also Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, art. 2.2. 
 156. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(a); see also Sarah Stewart & David Thomas, 
Comments on the Council’s Legal Service’s Paper On the WTO Compatibility of Meas-
ures Regulating the Seal Products Trade, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L & RESPECT FOR ANIMALS 
(Mar. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.hsus.org/about_us/humane_society_international_hsi/seal_trade_ban/learn_m
ore/wto_compatibility.html. (discussing how the Appellate Body in Asbestos upheld 
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(“HSI”) alleges that a total ban on seal products meets the “necessary” 
requirement because no alternative measures will produce the same de-
sired effect,157 that the ban meets the requirements of the chapeau since it 
applies to all seal products (and does not discriminate against one coun-
try’s products over another’s), and that it is not a disguised restriction on 
trade because it does not favor the EU’s seal products over foreign prod-
ucts.158 
However, the dispute settlement panel may also consider the costs such 
a trade measure will impose on countries like Canada and Norway.159 As 
previously acknowledged, higher animal welfare standards typically 
translate into increased production costs.160 In this case, the EU is not 
proposing an alternative method of seal slaughter so the costs are even 
more significant, since the countries selling seal products will no longer 
have access to the EU market. Thus, such a measure may be seen as a 
trade barrier161 that directly conflicts with the WTO’s overall mission to 
promote trade liberalization.162 However, a dispute settlement panel 
                                                                                                                       
France’s total ban on asbestos, based on France’s desire to protect the public from health 
risks associated with the product; this demonstrates that a total ban, in some instances, 
can be deemed appropriate and legal under the chapeau’s “flexibility” test, and, as in 
Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, the EU has engaged in attempts to create a multilateral 
agreement regarding welfare issues in seal hunting). 
 157. Neither of the two alternatives to a complete seal ban, (products from “humanely 
killed” seals or labeling to give purchasers information about the slaughter method), 
would work, because “[c]ommercial seal hunts, particularly in the environments in which 
they take place, cannot be consistently humane,” and because the seal hunt is the type of 
event “when moral sensibility demands that trade in an inhumanely produced product is 
banned . . . that public morality is offended by the very presence on the market of some-
thing which is inhumanely produced.” Stewart & Thomas, supra note 156. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., Shrimp/Turtle Malaysia II, supra note 106, ¶ 149 (discussing how a 
successful trade measure needs to take into account any other country’s “specific condi-
tions”); see also Archibald, supra note 76, at 48 (discussing how a country’s trade meas-
ure must be flexible enough so that another country is able to successfully meet the 
measure’s requirements through other methods).  
 160. See, e.g., D. Bowles et al., Animal Welfare and Developing Countries: Opportuni-
ties for Trade in High-Welfare Products from Developing Countries, 24 REV. SCI. TECH. 
OFF. INT. EPIZ. 783, 783 (2005), available at 
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/bowles783790.pdf (discussing how “there is often a 
cost consequence from improving [animal welfare] standards”). 
 161. One example of a trade barrier that the WTO is concerned with is “internal gov-
ernment regulations and practices that impede imports or discriminate against foreign 
goods.”  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 46, at 348. 
 162. The GATT states that the WTO members chose to enter into agreements “directed 
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” GATT, supra note 47, pmbl. 
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should ultimately view these costs, even in the case of a total elimination 
of a market, as less important than the fact that the animal welfare meas-
ure meets all of the requirements of Article XX(a), as it is a necessary 
measure for the protection of public morals that does not violate the cha-
peau. 
If the seal product ban is successful in defeating a WTO violation 
claim, it should open the door to use Article XX(a) to defend other ani-
mal welfare-driven measures.163 Seal slaughter may be considered “inhe-
rently cruel”164 because of the weather conditions and its isolated nature, 
while farming conditions can be controlled and changed. However, it is 
difficult to see how the seal hunt’s practices are any more inhumane than 
those common to intensive farming practices, such as battery cages.165 
Further, intensive confinement practices continue for the farm animals’ 
entire lives; this fact could offend public morals even more than an ab-
horrent seal slaughter technique. According to 2003 survey data, 96% of 
Americans believe that animals should have “at least some protection 
from harm and exploitation”166 and 62% of Americans support the pas-
sage of “strict laws concerning the treatment of farm animals.”167 As 
shown by these statistics, conventional intensive farming techniques that 
cause severe harm to animals are offensive to the American public. Fur-
                                                                                                                       
 163. Although, especially in the case of banning certain practices in agriculture, it may 
be more difficult to succeed under the “necessary” section of Article XX. Unlike the 
slaughter of seals, which occurs on isolated ice floes, U.S. slaughterhouses are regulated 
by the Department of Agriculture. See, e.g., Slaughter Inspection 101, DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Factsheets/Slaughter_Inspection_101/index.asp (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2010); see also HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L, A COMPLETE BAN ON SEAL PRODUCTS IS 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) AGREEMENTS (2009), avail-
able at http://bansealtrade.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/hsi-seals-wto-handout.pdf 
(“commercial seal hunting occurs in uncontrolled field settings plagued by . . . moving 
ice floes, extreme weather conditions, poor visibility, and high ocean swells. These con-
ditions prohibit hunters from . . . consistently applying humane slaughter methods de-
signed to protect animal welfare and avoid pain and suffering . . . [and] preclude authori-
ties from adequately monitoring . . . and enforcing regulations”). 
 164. Canada, Norway, supra note 152. 
 165. See, e.g., Michael Hlinka, Money Talks: Michael Hlinka: EU Ban on Seal Prod-
ucts Outrageous, CBC NEWS, (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.cbc.ca/money/moneytalks/2009/05/michael_hlinka_eu_ban_on_seal.html 
(“We’re supposed to believe that there’s a heightened sensitivity to animal welfare on 
[the European] continent . . . [b]ut there’s no mention of the treatment of geese for foie 
gras, or the killing of baby calves for veal . . . this particular bill is just so selective in its 
outrage . . . .”). 
 166. David W. Moore, Public Lukewarm on Animal Rights, GALLUP NEWS SERV., 
(May 21, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/8461/public-lukewarm-animal-rights.aspx. 
 167. Id. 
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thermore, as previously discussed relevant to Article XX(b),168 a total 
ban on battery cages would meet the “necessary” requirement of Article 
XX(a),169 because the intensive production methods would need to be 
eliminated in order to reduce the harm to animal welfare. The ban would 
satisfy Article XX’s chapeau, since it would apply to all battery cage 
eggs from all countries, including those within the U.S. Additionally, a 
battery cage ban would not be a total trade barrier for eggs, since battery 
cage eggs could be replaced by cage-free eggs. Based on all of these fac-
tors, a dispute settlement panel should deem a battery cage ban protected 
under Article XX(a). 
III. POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANIMAL WELFARE 
MEASURES UNDER THE SPS AGREEMENT AND THE 
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
Additionally, two Agreements annexed to the GATT should provide 
support for the legality of a trade measure such as a battery cage ban. 
First, the SPS Agreement was created to give WTO members “the right 
to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health,”170 and is meant to be an elabo-
ration of certain GATT provisions, “in particular the provisions of Ar-
ticle XX(b).”171 Second, the Agreement on Agriculture (“AoA”)172 was 
created to “strengthen[] multilateral rules for trade in agricultural prod-
ucts and require[] WTO members to reduce protection against imports, 
trade-distorting domestic support programs, and export subsidies.”173 It 
also allows countries to create “non-trade-distorting,” or Green Box, sub-
sidies.174 The SPS Agreement and the AoA should be used to defend an-
                                                                                                                       
 168. See supra Part II.B. 
 169. GATT, supra note 47, art. XX(a). 
 170. SPS, supra note 134, art. 2(1). 
 171. Id., art. 2(4). For the argument that the SPS Agreement only applies to Article 
XX(b), see Shapiro, supra note 91, at 201–02. 
 172. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter AoA]. 
 173. OFFICE OF THE USTR, THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE, (Sept. 27, 1994), available at 
1994 WL 761603. The AoA is necessary because “[t]rade in agricultural products is the 
area of international trade most subject to government intervention and other protectionist 
measures that distort free trade.”  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 46, at 457. 
 174. Phoenix X. F. Cai, Think Big and Ignore the Law: U.S. Corn and Ethanol Subsi-
dies and WTO Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 865, 875 (2009). 
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imal welfare trade measures and programs,175 respectively, to incentivize 
the more humane treatment of farm animals. 
A. The SPS Agreement and OIE International Standards 
The SPS Agreement, especially when coupled with GATT Article 
XX(b), should provide protection for an animal welfare measure banning 
battery cages. Although the SPS Agreement applies to sanitary and phy-
tosanitary measures to protect food safety or human, animal, or plant life 
or health,176 the connections made between animal health and animal 
welfare177 suggest that measures concerning animals who produce food 
products (such as egg-laying hens), are relevant under this Agreement. 
The SPS Agreement’s “principal objective . . . is to promote the harmo-
nization of national standards;”178 measures that “conform to internation-
al standards, guidelines, or recommendations” are automatically deemed 
“necessary” for the protection of human, animal or plant life.179 In con-
nection with this goal of harmonization, the OIE, which is seen as “the 
primary source of . . . international health standards” on animal health 
issues,180 is mandated by the SPS Agreement “to safeguard world trade 
by publishing health standards for international trade of animals and an-
imal products.”181 The OIE’s Terrestrial Animal Health Code (“Terre-
strial Code”)182 contains a chapter with Animal Welfare provisions,183 
                                                                                                                       
 175. See, e.g., Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56, at 352. 
 176. SPS, supra note 134, Annex A(1). 
 177. See, e.g., The OIE’s Objectives, supra note 124. 
 178. David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade 
Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INTL’L L. & POL. 865, 884 
(2000); see also SPS, supra note 134. 
 179. SPS, supra note 134, art. 3.2; see also Shapiro, supra note 91, at 204 (discussing 
how SPS measures that follow international standards have a “presumption of com-
pliance with the GATT because they are presumed to satisfy GATT Article XX(b)”). But 
see The International Standards of the OIE, WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH, 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/A_standardisation_activities.pdf  (last visited July 31, 
2010) (discussing how even when following an OIE-prescribed standard, a risk assess-
ment may be necessary, to “link[] the hazards identified for the specific commodity, the 
disease statuses of the exporting and importing countries, and the recommendations in the 
[OIE-prescribed] Codes”). 
 180. FAVRE, supra note 58, at 316. 
 181. What Is the OIE?, WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.oie.int/eng/oie/en_oie.htm. 
 182. TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE, supra note 136. The Code includes stan-
dards “to assure the sanitary safety of international trade in terrestrial animals.” Id., for-
ward, available at http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_preface.htm#sous-chapitre-
0. 
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but the chapter focuses on transporting animals by sea,184 land,185 or 
air;186 slaughtering animals;187 killing animals for controlling disease;188 
guidelines on how to control stray dog populations;189 and guidelines for 
using animals for research or education purposes.190 The Code references 
the importance of animal welfare by stating that humans who use ani-
mals have an “ethical responsibility” to ensure animal welfare “to the 
greatest extent practicable,”191 and also that higher animal welfare can 
often improve food safety.192 
While the OIE’s current statements do not set international standards 
that easily translate to animal welfare measures,193 there are signs that 
this may soon change. The OIE publicly vocalized its commitment to 
setting standards for animal welfare;194 the organization further defined 
the link between animal health and welfare by declaring that “animals 
managed in accordance with the OIE recommendations on animal wel-
fare may be more productive, with associated benefits for food security 
                                                                                                                       
 183. Id., § 7: Animal Welfare, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_titre_1.7.htm. 
 184. Id., ch. 7.2: Transport of animals by sea, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.2.htm. 
 185. Id., ch. 7.3: Transport of animals by land, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.3.htm. 
 186. Id., ch. 7.4: Transport of animals by air, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.4.htm. 
 187. Id., ch. 7.5: Slaughter of animals, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.5.htm. 
 188. Id., ch. 7.6: Killing animals for disease control purposes, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.6.htm. 
 189. Id., ch. 7.7: Guidelines on stray dog population control, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/Mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.7.htm. 
 190. Id., ch. 7.8: Use of animals in research and education, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.8.htm. 
 191. Id., art. 7.1.2.6, available at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.7.1.htm. 
 192. Id., art. 7.1.2.7. 
 193. However, the Terrestrial Code does acknowledge the “five freedoms” (“freedom 
from hunger; thirst and malnutrition; freedom from fear and distress; freedom from phys-
ical and thermal discomfort; freedom from pain, injury and disease; and freedom to ex-
press normal patterns of behaviour”) and how they provide “valuable guidance in animal 
welfare.” Id., art. 7.1.2.2. 
 194. The OIE’s website states that it intends to “elaborate recommendations and guide-
lines covering animal welfare practices, reaffirming that animal health is a key compo-
nent of animal welfare.” The OIE’s Objectives, supra note 124; see also Matheny & 
Leahy, supra note 56, at 351; Michael Bowman, “Normalizing” the International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 293, 341 (2008). 
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and poverty alleviation.”195 An ad hoc Animal Welfare Group convened 
to develop new chapters for the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, which 
may be used to help uphold animal welfare measures in the future.196 The 
Agreement’s main purpose is to create international standards. The 
Agreement specifically gives the OIE the power to create those standards 
for animal safety, and through the OIE’s creation of a new chapter, it will 
formally recognize that animal welfare is interrelated with animal health. 
At the same time, the OIE’s animal welfare chapter could just result in 
minimum standards. Further attention should be paid to ensure that the 
OIE’s standards do not become the de facto setting (and that countries 
are allowed to create higher animal welfare standards than those pro-
scribed by the OIE). 
However, even without OIE-prescribed international standards, the 
SPS Agreement should provide a safe-haven for animal welfare meas-
ures. While SPS Article 2 mandates that a sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure be “based on scientific principles and [that it] is not maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence,” it also recognizes that there may 
not be relevant evidence available.197 In that case, under Article 5.7, a 
WTO member may “provisionally adopt” measures “on the basis of 
available pertinent information,” but must thereafter try to acquire more 
information in order to make a “more objective assessment of risk” and 
to review the measure “within a reasonable period of time.”198 However, 
in European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts,199 the Appellate Body found that the European Community’s 
(“EC”) ban of meat from cattle that had received growth hormones was 
inconsistent with the requirements of the SPS Agreement.200 In that case, 
the EC created a measure which was more stringent than international 
standards201 and failed to ensure that its measure was based on an appro-
                                                                                                                       
 195. Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Considerations Relevant To 
Private Standards in the Field of Animal Health, Food Safety and Animal Welfare, ¶ 9, 
G/SPS/GEN/822 (Feb. 25, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/sps/docs/G-SPS-GEN-822.pdf. 
 196. The OIE’s Objectives, supra note 124. 
 197. SPS, supra note 134, arts. 2.2, 5.7. 
 198. Id. art. 5.7. 
 199. Appellate Body Report, EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC—Measures Concern-
ing Meat]. 
 200. Id. 
 201. WTO members are able to create measures higher than the international standard, 
“if there is a scientific justification,” or if they conform with the risk assessments found 
in Article 5. See SPS, supra note 134, arts. 3.3, 5. 
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priate risk assessment.202 Thus, even measures such as the EC’s, which 
“were previously regarded as purely internal policy measures,” now must 
be justified to fit under the SPS Agreement’s protection.203 
Nevertheless, this case should not undermine the use of the SPS 
Agreement to defend a battery cage ban. Nations are generally given 
wide latitude “in setting their own food safety standards . . . [and] nearly 
all bona fide attempts to protect food safety will be consistent with the 
SPS Agreement.”204 In EC—Measures Concerning Meat, the available 
scientific evidence specifically did not support the EC’s allegation that a 
hormone ban was necessary.205 Additionally, in the case of a battery cage 
ban, there is little data on current intensive confinement practices’ detri-
mental effects on animal health and welfare,206 and much of the present 
data in the U.S. may be inaccurate since it is based on research funded by 
agribusiness.207 It is clear that more studies need to be conducted by neu-
tral third-parties; however, a few studies not funded by agribusiness do 
exist, which show the detrimental effects of battery cages on hens’ wel-
                                                                                                                       
 202. EC—Measures Concerning Meat, supra note 199, ¶ 208. The EC invoked the 
“precautionary principle” in connection with SPS Article 5.7, which allows a WTO 
member to adopt SPS measures on a provisional basis when there is insufficient scientific 
evidence (however, WTO members must still follow Article 5.7 guidelines). Id. ¶ 13; 
SPS, supra note 134, art. 5.7. However, the Appellate Body “rejected this argument . . . 
the precise bounds of the precautionary principle remain unsettled . . . [but] [i]t appears 
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is not an alternative to risk assessment and scientific evidence for a definitive standard.” 
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 66, at 500. 
 203. Victor, supra note 178, at 923. 
 204. Id. at 872. 
 205. See, e.g., EC—Measures Concerning Meat, supra note 199, ¶ 196–7. 
 206. See, e.g., Crumb, supra note 19 (discussing how the USDA is funding a three-
year study to determine how battery cage practices affect hens, but animal welfare groups 
contend that this is a “delaying tactic” to banning cages; another study funded by the 
American Egg Board “weighs several issues involving caged chickens, including their 
welfare and impact on the environment and human health as well as food quality and 
safety”); see also Steven M. Wise, An Argument for the Basic Legal Rights of Farmed 
Animals, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 133, 135 (2008) (“We do not know much 
about the cognitive abilities of farmed animals, because those who make billions of dol-
lars exploiting them have never bothered to conduct significant research into what sorts 
of beings they are”). 
 207. See, e.g., What’s Good for the Goose, supra note 126, at 163 (discussing how 
U.S. animal welfare science is controlled by agribusiness, in contrast to Europe, where 
animal welfare science “appears to have developed in a relatively objective manner”); see 
also F. Bailey Norwood & Jayson L. Lusk, The Farm Animal Welfare Debate, CHOICES 
MAGAZINE (2009), http://www.choicesmagazine.org/magazine/article.php?article=89 
(“Industry groups, especially the United Egg Producers . . . assert that their welfare stan-
dards are based on ‘sound’ science . . . but there are many studies backing HSUS’s claim 
that cage-free eggs are superior to cage eggs in terms of animal welfare . . . . ” ). 
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fare and health.208 Furthermore, in terms of human health risks, the 
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (“CAST”),209 with help 
from the OIE,210 issued a 2005 report concluding that modern day inten-
sive confinement systems have created a world in which “global risks of 
disease are increasing.”211 In the meantime, the U.S. should be able to 
enact a measure on a provisional basis under SPS Article 5.7, while al-
leging insufficient available scientific evidence.212 Under this measure, 
the U.S. could allege that on the basis of available information,213 inten-
sive confinement severely reduces animal health and welfare, which is 
directly correlated to sanitary and phytosanitary issues, and it could cite 
the EU’s recent Directive banning battery cages to show that other coun-
tries are similarly concerned and are passing similar measures.214 
Of course, an SPS measure such as a battery cage ban could also be 
seen as a trade barrier due to the fact that it would affect a country’s pro-
duction costs.215 However, a GATT Panel should give these costs less 
weight considering the fact that the SPS Agreement was created, in part, 
to protect animal health, which OIE has proclaimed to be connected to 
animal welfare.216 Therefore, if the welfare of a hen is compromised, so 
is her health. Additionally, as shown through a recent OIE study, even 
some developing countries demonstrate an interest in animal welfare 
concerns217 and organic food production, which can lead to increased 
animal welfare,218 thus illustrating that both developed and developing 
                                                                                                                       
 208. See, e.g., Shields & Duncan, supra note 138. 
 209. CAST is a non-profit organization that is dedicated to publishing reports of 
science-based information, regarding issues of “animal sciences, food sciences and agri-
cultural technology . . . .” About CAST, CAST, http://www.cast-science.org/about.asp 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
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CAST], available at http://www.cast-science.org/publicationDetails.asp?idProduct=69; 
see also FOER, supra note 2, at 142. 
 211. CAST, supra note 210, at 6; see also FOER, supra note 2, at 142. 
 212. SPS, supra note 134, art. 5.7. 
 213. See, e.g., Shields & Duncan, supra note 138. 
 214. See Council Directive 99/74, 1999 O.J. (L 203/53), amended by Council Regula-
tion 806/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 122) (EC). 
 215. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 46, at 348. 
 216. See The OIE’s Objectives, supra note 124. 
 217. See, e.g., Bowles, supra note 160, at 784 (“Good agricultural practices and tra-
ceability systems are being implemented in Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Zim-
babwe”). 
 218. See, e.g., id. at 787 (“In both Argentina and Thailand, organic production is being 
promoted with government support . . . [g]rowth within the organic foods market is ex-
pected and will continue to allow many exporters in developing markets to access mar-
kets . . . organic production . . . can bring benefits for animal welfare”). 
294 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
countries can still successfully produce products under an appropriately 
constructed animal welfare trade measure. Based on support from Article 
XX(b), the SPS Agreement, the OIE’s acknowledgment of the link be-
tween animal health and welfare, and its plan to create animal welfare 
international standards,219 a battery cage ban should be upheld under the 
SPS Agreement. 
B. The Agreement on Agriculture: Green Box Subsidies 
There should also be an opportunity for the AoA to support animal 
welfare measures. The AoA creates limits on a country’s ability to give 
subsidies to its domestic agricultural producers “depending on how much 
[the subsidies] distort production and trade.”220 Subsidies that are “highly 
trade-distorting” are called “Amber Box;” “minimally trade-distorting” 
subsidies are called “Blue Box;” and “non-trade-distorting” subsidies are 
called “Green Box.”221 The AoA allows countries an unlimited allow-
ance of Green Box subsidies,222 provided that the subsidies are in the 
form of “publicly-funded government program[s] . . . not involving 
transfers from consumers” and provided that they do not “have the effect 
of providing price support to producers.”223 An example of a program 
which would affect production is the Biomass Crop Assistance Program, 
which “provides direct payments to farmers for establishing crops that 
can be converted to biomass.”224 However, if properly devised, Green 
Box subsidies should provide an opportunity for countries to create farm 
animal welfare programs to increase humane treatment.225 Gaverick Ma-
                                                                                                                       
 219. See The OIE’s Objectives, supra note 124. 
 220. Cai, supra note 174. 
 221. Id. at 877. However, Green Box subsidies must meet the “minimally trade-
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 225. See Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH. 
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nontrade commodity benefits . . . [such as] environmental protection[] and animal wel-
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theny and Cheryl Leahy’s article, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, 
and Trade,226 argues that subsidies to agricultural producers “for more 
animal-friendly housing, equipment, training, and certification” may 
meet Green Box requirements.227 However, Green Box subsidies for an-
imal welfare payments have not yet been “explicitly allowed” by the 
WTO228 and “[b]ecause Green Box payments mean extra costs for gov-
ernments, they must have widespread political support”229 to rationalize 
those costs being passed on to taxpayers. Furthermore, some countries 
within the WTO are pushing to place limits on Green Box subsidies, al-
leging that they need to be amended to better reflect the concerns of de-
veloping countries.230 For example, some developing countries argue that 
any type of subsidy causes trade distortions, because “[g]overnments in 
developing countries simply do not have the financial resources needed 
to subsidize their own farmers at the same levels that farmers in devel-
oped countries are being subsidized.”231 
However, the U.S. asserts that animal welfare subsidies should be con-
sidered as Green Box subsidies.232 Furthermore, while a country must 
notify the WTO of its new Green Box programs, it has “a broad amount 
of discretion in the calculation and classification of [its] own domestic 
support programs.”233 Given the degree of leeway permitted through self-
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 226. Matheny & Leahy, supra note 56. 
 227. Id. at 352. 
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 231. Person, supra note 221, at 327. Some developing countries believe that even 
green box subsidies “may cause irreparable injury . . . [because the developing countries] 
cannot compete against foreign treasuries.”  Id. 
 232. HUMANE SOC’Y & GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., HUMANE, 
SUSTAINABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY DEVELOPMENT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
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4 (Dec. 13–18, 2005), available at 
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 233. Christian, supra note 224, at 181. 
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reporting, countries should be able to experiment with new programs 
with little oversight. However, this could lead to an abuse of power, as a 
subsidy program can affect production decisions. If a farmer uses the 
subsidy to create a more humane production system, the long-term labor 
costs associated with humane production, which are passed on to con-
sumers in the form of higher prices, may affect the farmer’s decision to 
produce more or less in the future. 
On the other hand, if a Green Box subsidy program is created to give 
farmers financial and technical assistance or “income compensation for 
loss of competitiveness”234 due to making animal welfare improvements, 
these changes can be viewed as comparable to U.S. environmental con-
servation programs that have already been deemed to meet Green Box 
requirements.235 For example, the Conservation Technical Assistance 
program, which “provides technical assistance to farmers and ranchers 
who implement soil and water conservation and water quality improve-
ment,” is considered a Green Box program,236 as is the Conservation Re-
serve Program, which “provides [technical and financial] assistance to 
farmers and ranchers in complying with Federal, State, and tribal envi-
ronmental laws . . . .”237 Like farmers who utilize these types of envi-
ronmental conservation subsidies in order to conserve resources, farmers 
should be able to make their animal production systems more humane 
without having to sacrifice their market share. Furthermore, a program 
that provides support for animal-friendly housing should serve as a help-
ful tool for egg producers to use in order to comply with the new laws in 
the U.S.;238 the U.S. should welcome such measures, given the recent 
increase in concern over animal welfare, as evidenced by statutes like 
Prop 2. 
CONCLUSION 
Animal welfare is connected to public morals, animal health, and food 
safety—issues that are all acknowledged in GATT Articles XX(a), 
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XX(b), and the SPS Agreement.239 Therefore, the WTO should recognize 
animal welfare measures such as the battery cage bans that countries are 
beginning to enact. Although there are costs involved in implementing a 
battery cage ban given that producers will have to create new production 
systems,240 WTO dispute settlement panels should find that any potential 
costs to a country will be outweighed by the fact that the measure is not 
discriminatory and it truly goes to the heart of Articles XX(a), (b), or the 
SPS Agreement. Finally, the U.S. should develop and offer Green Box 
subsidies to incentivize producers to create more humane agricultural 
production systems, especially given the recent outpouring of public 
support for the more humane treatment of animals.241 
Public sentiment in the U.S. looks longingly back at traditional farm-
ing practices, when animals were perhaps treated more like sentient be-
ings, and less like egg making machines. Yet, at the same time, factory 
farms still dominate the agricultural landscape. Globalization has and 
continues to change the way that our food is produced, yet current agri-
cultural methods will need to be revised to comply with demands for 
more ethical practices.242 While the WTO traditionally left animal wel-
fare out of trade negotiations, the changing tide of public concern sug-
gests that it is time to take a practical look at the interrelatedness of trade 
and animal welfare. As Steven Wise so succinctly stated, “There is only 
one reason not to determine what rights farmed animals are due and rec-
ognize them. That is the reason that once justified human slavery: power-
ful economic interests are arrayed against it.”243 More humanely pro-
duced foods are in real demand, “based on consumers’ common sense 
understanding that such practices as gestation crates, veal creates and 
battery cases are not humane.”244 One day, economics and animal wel-
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fare will need to strike a balance, and both interests will need to be pre-
served within international trade negotiations. Though it may not be to-
day, we are moving in the right direction. 
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